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people are. However, although knowledge and representational practices do not exhaust who we are, they
are central to the human condition. How can we follow Taylor in shifting away from a knowledge-centered
account of human nature, while nonetheless capturing how representation is central to many human
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The Interdependence Of Representation And Action
Stanton Wortham
University Of Pennsylvania
After spending many years arguing about the nature of knowledge in the human
sciences, Charles Taylor decided that the core disagreements were not epistemological but ontological.1 Instead of simply focusing on how people know (and on how
to know them), we must unearth our presuppositions about what people are.
However, although knowledge and representational practices do not exhaust who
we are, they are central to the human condition. How can we follow Taylor in shifting
away from a knowledge-centered account of human nature, while nonetheless
capturing how representation is central to many human activities?
For those of us who study language, this question has often been cast in terms
of the referential and interactional functions of speech. Since Austin, many philosophers and social scientists have focused on the interactional functions of speech.2 We
now know that speakers and audience members respond systematically to the
interactional positioning that is signaled by speech, even though they are often
unaware of doing so.3 This work on verbal action has weakened purely referential
approaches to speech, which has been salutary, but we must not lose sight of the fact
that speech also refers. In order to develop an adequate conceptualization of how
speech can simultaneously refer and accomplish action, I argue that we must go
beyond recognizing the coexistence of multiple functions.4 We must also consider
how the referential and interactional functions of speech systematically interrelate.
This essay considers a particular type of case in which the referential and
interactional functions of speech are deeply interrelated. I argue that in such cases
neither the referential nor the interactional functions of speech can be derived from
the other, because the two are mutually dependent. The interdependence between
reference and action in this type of case may provide a model for how to conceptualize the interrelations between knowledge-based and other kinds of practices.
ENACTED PARTICIPANT EXAMPLES
In a participant example, participants in the conversation get cast as characters
in an example. These participants then have two roles: as characters referred to in
the example and as participants acting in the conversation. Participant examples
occur approximately once every fifteen minutes in high school literature and history
class discussions.5 In some cases, like the one described here, participants act out the
roles given to them as referents in the example. That is, in discussing a particular set
of events and relationships as the content of an example, teachers and students
sometimes enact analogous events and relationships in their own classroom interaction. I have shown that such enactment happens more than one might expect.6
The following participant example occurred in one ninth-grade history class
described at length in my Acting Out Participant Examples in the Classroom.7 The
class has read Cicero’s letter to Atticus, in which Cicero ponders what he should do
about the tyranny of Caesar and the plot to overthrow him. Should he tell Caesar?
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Should he join the plotters? Or should be just keep quiet? In this respect, the text
represents a three-part structure in Rome: Caesar-the-tyrant, those plotting against
him, and Cicero stuck in between the two. The teacher (Mr. Smith, abbreviated T/
S) places a student (Maurice, abbreviated MRC) in a hypothetical situation analogous to Cicero’s and asks him what he would do. (Italics indicate stress. Numbers
in parentheses indicate pauses, in seconds. Left brackets indicate overlapping talk.)
See original for formatting of transcripts!!!
T/S:
Maurice let’s give a good example, you’ll love this.
suppose this dictator, me. there was a plot going on.
150
and you found out about it. and you knew it was gonnait’s existing (3.0) among the people you knew. would
you tell me. (5.0)
MRC:
you said they know about it.
T/S:
the plotters, against me. they’re planning to push me
155
down the stairs. [ and you know about it
STS:
[hahhahahah
T/S:
now we all know Maurice and I have had arguments
all year. would you tell me about it.
MRC:
well- I might but uh what if they- what if they found
160
out that I told you then they want to kill me. (5.0) so
I’m putting myself in trouble to save you, and I’m not
going to do it.
STS:
hnh hahahaha
Read for its referential contribution to the academic discussion, the example
describes a role structure analogous to that in Rome: Mr. Smith-the-tyrant, the
conspirators plotting to push him down the stairs, and Maurice-the-potentialinformer stuck between the two. This is a participant example because Mr. Smith and
Maurice, participants in the speech event itself, now have a second role within the
example.
Because it doubles the roles played by Mr. Smith and Maurice, this example has
rich interactional potential. Discussion of the represented content of the example
may spill over into the classroom interaction. At line 157, for example, Mr. Smith
says “now we all know Maurice and I have had arguments all year.” Prior to the
example, everyone in the class knows that Mr. Smith and Maurice have had a
strained relationship. Mr. Smith imposes a relatively rigid code of conduct, and
Maurice has resisted this all year. As he says at line 157, and as presupposed by his
“you’ll love this” at line 148, Mr. Smith recognizes his power struggle with Maurice.
He mentions it at this point because he also recognizes that the example may have
implications for their actual relationship. It gives Maurice the opportunity, within
the example, to express his anger at Mr. Smith-the-teacher. Maurice takes this
opportunity, in places, by imagining that he would leave Mr. Smith-the-tyrant to be
killed.
Participant examples sometimes spill into the interaction in a particular way:
teachers and students sometimes enact the represented content of participant
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examples. In the example of Mr. Smith-the-tyrant, for instance, Mr. Smith himself
comes to act tyrannically in his interaction with Maurice, and Maurice gets stuck in
the middle like Cicero. Mr. Smith asks Maurice-the-potential-informer whether he
would take Mr. Smith-the-tyrant’s side or whether he would join the other students
who are opposed to Mr. Smith-the-tyrant. This interactional issue — central to the
represented content of the example — also has implications for participants’ own
identities and interactional positions. Mr. Smith-the-teacher makes it clear that he
would like Maurice-the-student to side with him. Thus Maurice himself gets put in
the same interactional position as Cicero: he must choose either to ally himself with
those in power or to affiliate with the opposition. This position becomes uncomfortable for Maurice, as it was for Cicero. See original for formatting of transcripts!!!
T/S:
well that was my next question, do you think Caesar was
a tyrant. [
do you think Cicero thought
185 ST?:
[I don’t think so.
T/S:
Caesar was a tyrant.
ST?:
no
MRC:
yes
T/S:
then what’s his problem. if the man- you just told me
190
point blank
[ that we could be pushed down stairs
MRC:
[so.
T/S:
and you wouldn’t feel a thing about it. what’s his big
deal, if he believes Caesar is a tyrant, so what.
MRC:
well- he- if uh he finds out that they’re making
195
some kind of plot against him, but he doesn’t want to
get involved. he doesn’t know if he should get
involved, he could get himself in more trouble.
T/S:
well if Caesar’s a tyrant why shouldn’t you get
involved. tyrants are generally dictatorial nasty
200
people, that prevent people from being at their ease.
When Mr. Smith says “you just told me point blank that we could be pushed down
stairs and you wouldn’t feel a thing about it” (lines 189-192), both the volume and
tempo of his speech increase. He seems angry. Even though they are speaking about
a hypothetical example, Mr. Smith-the-teacher treats Maurice’s choice not to tell
him as a betrayal.
This starts to put the same sort of pressure on Maurice-the-student that was
applied to Cicero and to Maurice-the-potential informer. When Maurice describes
Cicero’s hesitation in the face of his dilemma (lines 194-198) he could also be
describing his own situation. He can tell that his answer does not please Mr. Smiththe-teacher, but he does not know what to do about it. In forcing Maurice-the-student
into this position, Mr. Smith-the-teacher also acts a bit tyrannically — thus acting
out the represented content in another respect.
At this point, Mr. Smith may simply be play-acting to involve the students. But
Maurice-the-student’s problems become more serious when several girls volunteer
to tell the teachers about the plot. (T/B is Mrs. Bailey, another teacher leading this
classroom discussion along with Mr. Smith. CAN is Candace, a female student. )
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T/S:
T/B:
225

230

CAN:
STS:
235 T/B:
T/S:
T/B:
MRC:
240 T/B:
MRC:
T/B:
MRC:
CAN:
245 ST?:
MRC:
T/S:
CAN:

gee you sound terribly confused
Maurice. sort of like Cicero here.
what w- if you knew that they actually you know there’s
a group of kids that are actually going to do
this dastardly deed. and you know that there’s going to
be some reaction. what might you do th- and you kn- you
know basically while you might not be- enamored
totally of Mr. Smith or myself you- basically don’t
wish that we were crippled for life or whatever, what
might you do that day. you know that’s going to comethat this is all going to happen on Wednesday. what are
you going to do that day.
I would try to warn you.
right. I would ((* overlapping
[ comments *))
[he’s- he’s not- he’s not
going to warn us though.
no.
what- what are you going to do that day Maurice. (1.0)
stay away.
what are you going to do?
I’m going to stay away so I won’t beso you’re not going to come to school on Wednesday.
no
that way he’s a coward.
what would you do.
what would you do.
a coward.
yeah ‘cause he’s scared.

When Candace calls Maurice a coward (line 244), she begins to speak as Candacethe-student. Her energetic tone here indicates that she is not only elaborating the
example, but also picking on Maurice-the-student. This establishes another relevant
group in the classroom interaction — Candace and the girls (several of whom
subsequently join her) — who position themselves with respect to Maurice and the
teachers. Like their characters in the example, in the classroom the girls affiliate with
the teachers and exclude Maurice.
Gender plays an important role here, as it has all year in this ninth grade
classroom. Girls and boys generally occupy separate, often antagonistic groups.
Girls have more latitude to affiliate with teachers. Boys act more oppositionally
toward teachers and risk losing face if they do not. Maurice has had particular
difficulty with this gender difference over the school year. He is intelligent and
motivated to participate in class, but he does not want to jeopardize his masculinity
by joining the girls and the teachers in classroom discussions. I observed Maurice
struggle with this in-between position all year.
Mr. Smith and Candace both presuppose and intensify Maurice’s predicament,
through their discussion of the example. Maurice might like to affiliate with Mr.
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Smith-the-tyrant and thus, implicitly, with Mr. Smith-the-teacher, since he has
aroused Mr. Smith-the-teacher’s anger by distancing himself. But to do so, he would
have to affiliate with both the teachers and the girls. This would damage his standing
with the other boys.
Thus Maurice-the-student acts out the dilemma confronted by Cicero and by
Maurice-the-potential informer. Like Maurice-the-potential informer (and like
Cicero), Maurice-the-student gets excluded by the other groups as he thinks about
what to do. Mr. Smith-the-teacher also plays the role of tyrant relatively well. Like
a tyrant, he has the power to reward students if they behave properly and punish them
if they do not. He uses this power to tyrannize Maurice-the-student, by forcing
Maurice into a difficult situation and then excluding him.
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF REPRESENTATION AND ENACTMENT
How should we conceptualize such parallelism between represented content
and interactional positioning? One important question involves the priority of one
function over the other: is the enactment derived from the representation, or vice
versa? I argue that neither of these positions suffices. Instead, the represented and
enacted patterns interrelate, such that each contributes to the other.
The clearest case of the inevitable interrelation between representation and
enactment comes from the category of linguistic forms called deictics, which occur
in all known human languages and are ubiquitous in speech. The category includes
personal pronouns, demonstratives (English this/that), spatial and temporal adverbs
(here/there, now/then), verb tense, and so on. Deictics “single out objects of
reference or address in terms of their relation to the current interactive context in
which the utterance occurs.”7 Deictics often presuppose some aspect of participants’
interactional positions as the warrant for their referential value. We provides an
example. For hearers to understand what a particular utterance of we refers to, they
must know something about presupposed social groups that include the speaker. We
presupposes a radial geometry centered on the speaker, with the speaker a member
of some group. People referred to as they lie beyond some boundary, while people
referred to as we lie inside the boundary with the speaker. Hearers can only
understand what a particular token of we refers to by presupposing something about
the relevant social groups in the speaker’s world, including the event of speaking.
The existence and ubiquity of deictics thus shows that in many cases interactional
patterns (for example, who belongs in the same social group as the speaker) are
intrinsically related to the referential meaning of language in use.
Deictics show that in actual speech neither referential nor interactional functions ever exist independent of the other. Just as the referential function of language
depends on interactional structures, the interactional functions of language depend
on referential structures. By virtue of referring to some social group that includes the
speaker, for instance, a particular use of we can potentially create or reinforce
solidarity among members of a group. In a bid to create community among an
ethnically diverse group of students, a teacher might refer to himself or herself plus
all the students as we. If others in the class come to presuppose this usage, these
deictics might be central to creating the desired community. This use of we to create
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social solidarity would not happen unless the deictic referred to the relevant group.
Thus the referential and interactional functions of deictics, and of language use more
generally, depend on each other.
With enacted participant examples, which involve more elaborate parallelism
between reference and interaction, I give a similar argument: neither the represented
nor the enacted pattern can be derived from the other. Maurice’s representation of
himself as caught in the middle between Mr. Smith and the student “conspirators”
may gain force from his interactional position as a black male student torn between
engagement in and withdrawal from school. But the representation cannot be
reduced to that interactional position. Similarly, Maurice’s enactment of his inbetween position gains force from the referential content of the example and the text;
but the enactment is not derived from and secondary to the representation. I argue
that representation and enactment in cases like this each contribute to the other, as
in the case of deictics.8 Maurice and Mr. Smith successfully represent his hypothetical predicament through a combination of referential and interactional patterns. And
they reinforce his difficult interactional position through a similar combination of
representation and enactment.
THE FUNCTIONS OF PARALLELISM
If neither the represented nor the enacted side of the parallel can be reduced to
the other, where does such parallelism come from? One possible explanation is
psychological. In his theory of transference, Freud notes that patients often enact, in
their relationship with the analyst, interactional patterns that match key relationships
from their past.9 While they describe their past relationships as part of therapy,
patients sometimes also enact similar relationships with the analyst in the therapeutic storytelling event. His psychological theory leads Freud to expect patients both
to describe and to enact similar patterns, because neurotics get stuck in relational
patterns they experienced with important others.
Freud’s theory might explain enacted participant examples. Perhaps Mr. Smith
and Maurice habitually relate to others in characteristic ways. Mr. Smith might want
younger males to affiliate with him, and Maurice might feel both drawn to and
repelled by male authority figures. Mr. Smith, then, would have described the
example because it represents relations that fit with his psychological needs. He and
Maurice would enact the example because their roles in the example fit with their
habitual ways of relating to others. Thus both the represented content and the enacted
interactional positions accomplished through the example would derive from Mr.
Smith and Maurice’s underlying psychological tendencies.
Freud’s observations about transference are brilliant.10 But I would propose an
alternative, partly cultural explanation for the parallel between represented content
and interactional positioning in examples like Mr. Smith’s. A more sociocentric
account can incorporate Freud’s extraordinary insights about transference without
adopting his metapsychology. Vincent Crapanzano argues that Freud’s concept of
transference can be understood as a matter of interactional positioning and not
psychological structure.11 Crapanzano argues that a Freudian description of underlying psychological tendencies really involves interactional and cultural as much as
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psychological patterns. Thus he moves toward a sociocentric account of the parallel
between represented content and interactional positioning: the social world offers
typical positions and events, and in practice people tend to enact particular configurations of these types over and over. In this view, the parallel between representation
and enactment results from the salience of certain socially-typical positions and
events. Just as any speaker inevitably has to “rent” the words he or she uses from the
already-used set of words available in a community, any person has to borrow the
categories of relationship and selfhood from his or her community.12 Mr. Smith and
Maurice do not both describe and enact the roles of tyrant and ambivalent subject
only because of something in their psychology, but also because of the ubiquity of
these as cultural patterns.
Applying this more sociocentric perspective to Maurice’s case would highlight
the representational and interactional pattern involving an authority figure (the
teacher), subordinates who side with authority (students who support the teacher’s
agenda) and subordinates who resist authority (students who do not participate
actively). This pattern, including the powerful, in-favor subordinates, and out-offavor subordinates, circulates widely in the larger society. Mr. Smith and Maurice
often represent and position themselves in more specific versions of this general
pattern, and on a sociocentric view they do so because of the wide cultural circulation
of the pattern.13
I find something compelling about both psychological and sociocentric accounts of the parallelism between representation and enactment. The sociocentric
account captures the social origin and circulation of the relational patterns that get
both represented and enacted. But the psychological account explains why particular individuals consistently represent and enact certain patterns, despite their
exposure to various patterns that circulate in the social world. In order to bring these
two perspectives together, I argue that the individual self — that which is prone to
represent and enact particular relational positions and not others — is simultaneously individual and social.
MAINTAINING THE SELF
The Russian philosopher and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin14 presents the self
not as a bounded territory but as what Morson and Emerson call a “boundary
phenomenon.”15 The self exists only on the boundary between self and other. It does
not contain or develop inner regions, but instead exists only in dialogue with the
other.
Bakhtin describes how a self emerges as speakers position themselves with
respect to others, by adopting and inflecting others’ words. “The ideological
becoming of a human being, in this view, is the process of selectively assimilating
the words of others.”16 To become a self one must speak and, in speaking, one must
use words that have been used by others. In using words that echo with the voices
of others one must take a position with respect to those others.17 Expanding this
analysis metaphorically from the level of the speech event to the level of a whole life,
Bakhtin argues that becoming a self involves positioning oneself with respect to
other speakers whose words (and relational stances, characteristic acts, and viewpoints) one takes on and then inflects to one degree or another.
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On Bakhtin’s account, then, a person cannot become a self alone. The self has
unique experiences and a unique trajectory because any particular self gets positioned with respect to the others it happens to encounter and position itself with
respect to. But this individual uniqueness gets fashioned only by speaking through
or ventriloquating others. In this way, as Clark and Holquist argue, Bakhtin attempts
to capture both the uniqueness and the dialogic character of the self.18
This puts the (Western) self in an ironic position: struggling to articulate its own
individual voice but able to do so only by speaking through others. Thus Bakhtin
offers neither a social nor a psychological account of the self.19 Against social
determinism, he does not reduce the self to social categories. On the contrary,
Bakhtin casts the creative self, ventriloquating others and creating complexity, as
the hero in the struggle against official monologic discourse. He praises Romanticism for elaborating this aspect of the self.20 But he complicates this view by locating
the self within a dialogic process.
Bakhtin’s account of the self on the boundary can help us conceptualize the
function of parallelism between representation and enactment. Instead of simply
manifesting either psychological schemata or cultural patterns, enacted participant
examples can be central to the process of maintaining the self on the boundary.21 I
argue that first-person discourse involving a parallel between representation and
enactment provides particularly rich opportunities for this process of maintaining
the self on the boundary.22 This process involves both individual and social aspects,
but neither of these can be reduced to or extricated from the other. Participant
examples and other speech events in which speakers both represent and enact
parallel patterns can maintain the self as a socially recognized type and recreate the
social type at the same time.
So exploring the phenomenon of parallelism between representation and
enactment has yielded a more general approach. I have argued that, instead of
reducing representation or enactment to the other, we must see both as part of larger
systems composed of mutually reinforcing components. Just as deictics accomplish
both representation and enactment through the systematic interrelation of referential
and interactional functions, broader human processes — like the construction and
maintenance of the self — depend on various mutually reinforcing components of
a system. Instead of separating out and prioritizing either representation or enactment, we should study examples of how these various components interrelate to
produce the self and other central human processes.
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